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Populism in political cartoons: caricatures of Nordic populist leaders 
Abstract: 
This article analyses political cartoons that depict contemporary populist politicians in Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden between 2005 and 2015, a period which focuses on the electoral successes of 
these movements. The hypothesis is that by analysing cartoons we can explore the underlying moral 
and normative confrontations linked to current political populism in the Nordic liberal democracies, 
which arose during the insurgent phase of the domestic right-wing parties. In total, 60 political 
cartoons are analysed by means of content categorisation and visual semiotics. The most popular 
caricatures in the cartoons depicted the leaders of the populist parties, while the most common 
signifiers linked the populism in the cartoons explicitly to fascism, Nazism, nativism and racism. In 
this, the cartoons differed from news journalism, reflecting the specific role of cartoons in public 
opinion discourse and indicating special characteristics that derive from particular political contexts 
and also the cartoonists’ own perspectives. 
Keywords: populism, political cartoons, Nordic countries, visual semiotics, life cycle model, moral 
order 
Political cartoons have long played a visible role in the history of newspapers and political satire, 
although their political importance has often been seen as rather marginal. Thus, cartoons, 
employing humour as their main weapon, may be mocking and satirical but remain quite harmless 
from the point of view of political power. As many theorists have argued, humour often works as a 
societal “safety valve”, allowing the discharge of anger and discontent in a way that does not harm 
but actually strengthens social order (see Mulkay, 1988). 
Nevertheless, there have been several occasions in the history of political cartoons that have 
resulted in real political effects. The most recent and perhaps best known were the publishing of 
twelve cartoons depicting the Islamic Prophet Mohammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten 
on 30 September 2005 and the cumulative effect of the cartoons that led to the terrorist massacre at 
the editorial office of Charlie Hebdo in Paris in 2015. The issues surrounding them emerged as 
global media events that caused riots in many countries and a violent thirst for revenge among 
fundamental Islamists and their opponents as well as large-scale debates over the freedom and 
responsibility of speech in Western societies (see e.g. Eide et al., 2008; Hollis-Touré, 2016). In the 
course of history, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have also censored and banned political 
cartoons and even persecuted political cartoonists. 
The power of cartoons possibly derives from the effectiveness of a caricature that visually 
represents features, sentiments and ideas that would require pages of literary explanations (Berger, 
1995, p. 144). Hence, political cartoons can bring to the fore underlying tendencies and common 
sense ideas of the political moment (Abraham, 2009, p. 119; Greenberg, 2002, p. 181; Hess & 
Northrop, 2011, p. 20). As such, cartoons provide a form of opinion discourse, which has been, 
according to Wiid et al. (2011, p. 138), approached through “weak” and “strong” theories. In weak 
theories it is believed that the cartoons can reveal the public attitudes of the time, but strong theories 
argue that cartoons themselves “actually persuade and shape public attitudes, intentions and 
behaviours” (ibid.). 
It is often difficult to empirically prove the actual effects of specific cartoons, if there are no such 
devastating and explicit consequences as in the Mohammad cartoon or the Charlie Hebdo cases (cf. 
Hess & Northrop, 2011, pp. 8–10). Therefore, this study applies rather the weak version of opinion 
discourse theory. It is argued here that by analysing cartoons depicting caricatures of contemporary 
populist leaders and agendas we can explore the underlying moral and normative confrontations 
linked to today’s political populism in the Nordic liberal democracies. 
Historically, political cartoons have had an established role as part of the editorial opinion discourse 
of newspapers. As printed newspapers have faced serious troubles during the last decades and many 
of them have even ceased to exist, the significance of political cartoons may have declined. 
However, Bal (2011, p. 135) reminds us that the Internet has “provided substantial and, importantly, 
highly accessible platforms and channels for professional and amateur cartoonists”. In this sense, 
one may even argue that political cartoons are enjoying a renaissance in the twenty-first century, 
“free of the many constraints of traditional media” (ibid.). 
At the same time, in many European liberal democracies populist radical right-wing movements 
emphasising a nationalist or nativist approach have raised their heads, meaning non-native groups 
and other minorities are marginalised or face even hostile attitudes towards them (e.g. Mudde, 2007, 
p. 19). As the populists have gained success and entered into parliaments and governing cabinets, 
the media attention on them has increased (see Mazzoleni et al., 2003; Anonymized, 2017a) and 
their leading representatives have become regular characters in cartoons that reflect contemporary 
political environments and moral controversies. 
However, as mainstream news media commonly represents democratic values, they are rather 
critical or even hostile to anti-immigration, xenophobic or racist right-wing populist rhetoric (see 
Herkman, 2016). Therefore, radical right-wing movements often use new communication 
technologies such as blogs and social media sites to bypass journalistic control and form their own 
identity (e.g. Krämer, 2017; Engesser et al., 2017). It is thus also probable that the political cartoons 
published by the mainstream news media are quite different to those images published and 
circulated in social media platforms favoured by the supporters of right-wing populist movements. 
This article analyses political cartoons published in mainstream news media, depicting 
contemporary populist right-wing movements and their leaders in Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
between 2005 and 2015. Since populism has been said to be a rather vague concept (e.g. Canovan, 
1999; Taggart, 2000), the main objective is to explore the significations of populism made by 
political cartoons when they caricature populist politicians. Therefore, the emphasis here is on 
studying the caricatures that capture politicians commonly called populists, meaning the leading 
figures of so-called contemporary populist parties. The focus here is on the cartoons published 
during the insurgent phases of those parties in the early 21st century. The research questions of the 
study are: 
RQ1. Whose caricatures were often portrayed in the political cartoons that interpreted the rise of the 
Nordic right-wing populist movements of the early 21st century? 
RQ2. What kind of meanings do the political cartoons emphasise with regard to populism in the 
period when the Nordic populist parties became successful? 
RQ3. How is populism visually signified in political cartoons? 
RQ4. What do the differences between the cartoons reveal about the contextual variations of the 
moral order in the Nordic countries? 
The main method of study is visual semiotics, despite research questions one and two being first 
answered by the classification of the cartoons. Before the cartoons are classified, the definitions of 
populism and the context of Nordic populism are briefly introduced. 
Theories of populism 
The term “populism” derives from Latin noun “populus” meaning “the people”. Therefore, it is 
possible to understand it in a positive light with regard to the democratic process (Canovan, 1999; 
Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). However, in political discourse populism is most commonly used 
pejoratively as it carries negative rather than positive connotations (Canovan, 2005; Bale et al., 
2011; Herkman, 2016). In its simplest interpretation, populism refers to a political style or rhetoric 
that appeals to the people by simplifying political issues and exacerbating others. Thus, “populist” 
refers to a politician who promises much to gain popularity but who is unable to keep promises. 
Nevertheless, this definition of populism as merely being a political style has been thought to be too 
simple because a populist antagonist almost always sets up confrontations of “us” – meaning “the 
people” – versus “them”; groups in the population – elites, immigrants, minorities – that are not 
identified as “the people” (see Jagers & Walgrave, 2006, pp. 336–337; Mazzoleni, 2014, p. 46). 
Therefore, an ideological dimension of populism has been considered. However, as Stanley (2008) 
has put it, ideology in populism has been described as “thin” since no coherent or single ideological 
core can be found in populism. Historically, populism has been linked to very different ideologies 
and movements – be they right- or left-wing, democratic or authoritarian, urban or agrarian 
(Taggart, 2000, p. 1). Laclau (2005) has emphasised in his theorisations that populism is a logic of 
political identity formation rather than a strict ideology, thus it can, as such, link contingently, i.e. 
“articulate” very different ideologies and approaches, which may even be in conflict or contradict 
one another depending on the specific context and political conjuncture. Thus, the power of 
populism actually lies in its “chameleonic” nature – in its capability to incorporate different kinds of 
political ideologies (Taggart, 2000; Stanley, 2008). 
Nevertheless, even if not all contemporary populist movements can be defined as right-wing, in 
twenty-first century European discussions populism has most commonly been linked to radical 
right-wing movements that emphasise nationalist and even nativist rhetoric (see Mazzoleni et al., 
2003; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2010). “Nativism” for Mudde (2007, p. 19) means “an ideology, 
which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the 
nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the 
homogenous nation-state”. Mudde’s (2007, p. 23) definition of populism as “a thin-centred 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic 
groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’” has been widely adopted by academic scholars, 
even though some criticism – especially of its ideological emphasis – has been made (e.g. Aslanidis, 
2016; Moffit & Tormey, 2014). 
Mazzoleni and his colleagues concluded their comparative study of the relationship between the 
media and populist movements with a life cycle model, in which “the insurgent phase” indicated 
that the increasing success of the movement was characterized by intense media attention (Stewart 
et al., 2003, pp. 219–220). Indeed, several studies have demonstrated a positive relationship 
between an increase in media attention and the success of populist movements and their leaders 
(e.g. Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2007; Roodjuin 2014), although there are also studies which 
challenge that argument (e.g. Pauwels, 2010; Bos & Brants, 2014). Anonymized’s (2017a) study 
shows that the life cycle model fits the Nordic context to some extent, but contextual differences 
can also be found between the countries. Even if the relationship between the media and populism 
has been extensively studied in the Nordic context and the history of political cartoons is well 
researched and various case studies have been conducted (e.g. Hess & Northrop, 2011; Kuipers, 
2011; Wiid et al., 2011; Van Hecke, 2017), the significations of populism found in political 
cartoons has not been previously studied. 
Contemporary populists in Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
The Nordic countries are typical representatives of consensual multiparty democracies based on the 
welfare state model. Paloheimo (2012, p. 329) has emphasised that populist parties have been 
especially successful in countries traditionally reliant on consensus in policy-making because the 
establishment is easily labelled a “corrupt elite” by populists. Successful populist movements 
appeared in Denmark, Norway and Finland already in the 1970s. However, in general, the Nordic 
parties garnered widespread success after they promoted intense criticism of immigration in the 
early 2000s, while a successful populist party only appeared in Sweden in the 2010s when the 
nationalist Sweden Democrats gained seats in parliament; the New Democracy movement of the 
1990s was a short-lived success (Fryklund, 2015). 
Table 1. The contemporary Nordic right-wing populist parties in Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
 Established Into 
parliament 
(votes % / 
seats) 






















































This study focuses on contemporary right-wing populist political parties in three Nordic countries 
(see Table 1): Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), The Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset, 
PS) and Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD). Due to its long history in the domestic 
party field and its libertarian orientation the Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP) has 
been excluded from the analysis because it represents a slightly different case, even if the party 
shares an anti-immigration programme with other European and Nordic radical right-wing parties. 
FrP also resembles traditional conservative rightist parties and is thus not always eagerly identified 
as a right-wing populist movement (see Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Allern, 2013). 
Both DF and PS were established in 1995 from the remnants of the successful populist parties of the 
1970s. They entered their political arenas as minor populist movements, but during the 21st century 
they have become established political players. DF assisted the conservative governments of 
Denmark between 2001 and 2011 and since the 2015 general election, when it became the second 
largest party. PS was a minor player before the “big bang elections” of 2011 (Arter, 2012), in which 
the party became the third largest. In the 2015 elections, PS lost votes but came second, joining the 
governing cabinet for the first time in its history. However, PS split into two at its party conference 
in 2017 when voting the strong immigration critic Jussi Halla-aho and his followers into leadership 
positions. The story of SD is different: thus far the party has been excluded from political decision-
making due to its National Socialist movement background (see Baas, 2014), even though it gained 
17.5 percent of the vote in the latest Swedish general election. In all three countries, the success of 
populist parties has challenged traditional consensus politics and the status quo of the party system 
(see Arter, 2012). 
In general, populism in the Nordic countries has not been regarded as offensive in style as it is in 
countries where politics is more confrontational (Widfeldt, 2010, p. 179). According to the 
European Social Survey (ESS), the supporters of the Nordic populist parties are quite different to 
extremist populist movements, because they rely on a democratic society and want to be integrated 
into it (Mesežnikov et al., 2008; Paloheimo, 2012, p. 337). However, even if there are different 
domestic emphases, nationalistic approaches and criticising immigration have been central issues in 
their programmes and in the public rhetoric of all three parties, which links them to other radical 
right-wing parties in Europe (see Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). 
The popularity of these parties in the 21st century’s elections has mainly relied on their charismatic 
party leaders, who have also received significant media attention. Jimmie Åkesson has tried to 
change the image of SD from that of a National Socialist movement towards being a serious 
political party and also led the party into Sweden’s parliament in the 2010s. However, some more 
radical members of the party, for example, Erik Almqvist, Kent Ekeroth and Christian Westling, 
have also become media figures. In Denmark, Pia Kjærsgaard was the original leader and most 
popular public figure of DF, but other leading members of the party, such as its current party leader 
Kristian Thulesen Dahl and the very popular Member of European Parliament, Morten 
Messerschmidt, have gained considerable media attention. In Finland, Timo Soini led PS for 20 
years and has been by far the most popular public figure of the party, but some radical MP’s, such 
as Jussi Halla-aho (current PS leader), Olli Immonen and Teuvo Hakkarainen, have also been the 
subject of intense media scrutiny. Consequently, all the persons mentioned above have also been 
depicted in political cartoons. 
Methods and materials 
The data used for the analysis contains 60 political cartoons – 20 from each country – portraying 
politicians from the contemporary populist parties of Sweden, Finland and Denmark. The materials 
were collected from the domestic media archives from which the political cartoons and caricatures 
published between 2005 and 2015 were mapped and the cartoons’ links to SD, PS and DF were 
examined. Digital archives are commonly text based and images are often excluded from their 
search engines and procedures. Therefore, it was practically impossible to make any statistically 
reliable searches into the cartoons and the material was gathered rather via the “snow-ball method” 
of exploring key cartoonists and their work, meaning first the mapping of the cartoonists who had 
targeted domestic populist politicians in their work and then a more detailed analysis of their 
cartoons. 
In Denmark, printed collections of political cartoons were also examined during the search process 
because Danish printed newspapers have separate archives for their digital formats. In Sweden, the 
sample was obtained by using the newsmap.se platform because other search procedures seemed 
rather unsatisfactory. The Finnish sample is based on a larger study of political cartoons linked to 
PS in which 201 systematically sampled cartoons were included in a statistical analysis 
(Anonymized, 2017b). A native research assistant with a good track record in media studies and 
politics collected material from Denmark. In Sweden and Finland research assistants helped in the 
mapping of cartoons, but I gathered the actual data after these pre-inquiries. For reasons of clarity, 
the focus was on cartoons that included explicit caricatures or portraits of populist party members, 
other types of cartoons were excluded because any other sample definition would have been rather 
unclear. 
Although the search period is between 2005 and 2015, the actual sample period varies between the 
countries due to their domestic populist parties’ differing histories. The cartoons were collected 
from the period of the relevant party’s “insurgent phase”. In Sweden this means year 2010 when SD 
received 5.7 percent of the vote in the parliamentary election, surpassing the four percent threshold 
value for a seat in parliament. In Finland PS received 19.1 percent of the votes in the 2011 “big 
bang” parliamentary election and became the third largest party. These were the turning points 
when the parties also became visible in mainstream political cartoons. After their electoral success, 
some party members of SD and PS caused nationwide public scandals due to racist speech and 
behaviour. In Sweden the largest media event was 2012’s “iron bar scandal”, while Jussi Halla-
aho’s court case, 2008–2012, and Olli Immonen’s Facebook scandal in 2015 were the most striking 
events in Finland (see Anonymized 2017c). In Denmark, DF had already lived through its insurgent 
phase earlier in the 2000s but faced its most wide-ranging scandal in 2007 when the party’s MP 
Morten Messerschmidt was alleged to have made a Nazi salute and sung Nazi songs in 
Copenhagen’s Tivoli. Thus, most of the sample cartoons in Sweden are from the period of 2010–
2014, in Finland from 2011–2015 and in Denmark from 2005–2010. 
In all countries, four or more artists were included in the sample in order to cover a variety of styles 
and publications. In Denmark, Jens Hage (e.g. Kristeligt Dagblad), Morten Ingemann (Ekstra 
Bladet) and Roald Als (Politiken) drew most of the sample cartoons, but Anne-Mette Steen Petersen 
(Politiken), Niels Thomsen, Anette Carlsen (Jyllands-Posten) and Niels Bo Bojesen (Jyllands-
Posten) are all represented by one cartoon. For the Swedish sample, most cartoons are drawn by 
Jan-Erik Ander, who is one of the founder members of the Kreabs information company and who 
has published political cartoons in such Swedish dailies as Norrköpings Tidningar and Svenska 
Dagbladet. In addition, cartoons by Riber Hansson, Leif Zetterling and Lennart Moberg are 
included. The first two are distinguished cartoonists, having published their drawings in many 
Swedish and European forums and Moberg has a background as a popular comic book artist who 
has recently enlarged his repertoire from comics to political satire. 
The Finnish material consist of cartoons drawn by four nationally famous cartoonists (five pictures 
from each of them). Henrik Karlsson draws cartoons for Helsingin Sanomat, the largest Finnish 
quality daily newspaper, three times a week. Timo Mäkelä aka ”Timppa” publishes his drawings in 
Ilta-Sanomat, the largest popular paper of Finland, two times a week, and Jari Elsilä publishes his 
cartoons three to five times a week in Kaleva, the largest regional newspaper in Northern Finland. 
Ville Ranta draws cartoons for Kirkko & Kaupunki, which is a weekly magazine published by the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. Ranta is famous for his highly provocative cartoons and, 
for example, he took part in the debates over the Muhammad cartoons through his own drawings in 
2006. Thus, except for two Danish pictures, all the cartoons studied have been published in 
mainstream newspapers or periodicals. 
The cartoons were first categorised so that the main target persons of the caricatures and the 
primary significations of populism in each country could be classified (cf. Rose, 2001, pp. 54–67). 
The sampling of the study here does not allow us to make any statistically reliable content analysis 
of Nordic “cartoon imagery”. Nevertheless, it is plausible that the categorisation of the caricatures 
and the main themes in the sample cartoons reveal common tendencies in the portrayal of Nordic 
populist politicians in cartoons during the insurgent phase of populist parties. After categorisation, 
the cartoons’ visual semiotics were analysed to find out how the cartoons try to convince their 
readers of their highlighted meanings or significations regarding the populist actors (see Moriarty, 
2005). 
Caricatures and main significations in the cartoons 
It is not a surprise that the party leaders of the domestic populist parties are by far the most popular 
figures represented in political cartoons linked to the populist movements. As part of the press 
publicity, political cartoons repeat the patterns commonly set in political news, in which leading 
political figures such as Presidents, Prime Ministers, and other key Ministers and party leaders 
dominate (cf. Bos et al., 2011). It is plausible, that in a statistically reliable sample, the share of 
populist leader caricatures could even be much higher than in this kind of selected sample, in which 
more variation in the caricatured figures was pursued on purpose (cf. Anonymized, 2017b). 
However, the cartoonists also draw caricatures of those members of populist parties who become 
public figures due to their provocative statements or behaviour, thus creating delicious material for 
political satire. 
In the Danish cartoons included in the sample, the original leader of DF, Pia Kjærsgaard, was the 
most popular figure portrayed and featured in 11 caricatures, whereas the current leader, Kristian 
Thulesen Dahl, was depicted in five caricatures (see Table 2). However, some other members of the 
party were also portrayed in political cartoons, for example, the current MEP Morten 
Messerschmidt features in three caricatures and has been a much satirised public figure in Denmark 
for years due to several nativist provocations he has made thus far in his political career (see Bruun, 
2012, pp. 165–166). In Finland, the long-term party leader of PS, Timo Soini, was depicted in 20 
caricatures, but the party’s current leader since 2017 and MEP Jussi Halla-aho and other party 
members were also portrayed in several cartoons between 2011 and 2015 because they have used 
more explicit racist and nativist rhetoric than Soini. Ville Ranta has especially depicted a 
heterogeneous group of characters in his cartoons, whereas other cartoonists have mostly focused 
on caricaturing the party leader (Anonymized, 2017b). In Sweden, Jimmie Åkesson was clearly the 
most popular figure to caricature but Mattias Karlsson was also caricatured twice in the sample 
during the period when he acted as party leader in 2014 and 2015. However, as the party has 
reached a more established status in the political field, some of its members – such as the Deputy 
Speaker of Parliament Björn Olof Sönder – have been portrayed in political caricatures. 









Success Populism Caricature 
figure 
- +/- + 
Denmark 17 6 5 9 - 5 1 (2) 10 10 - 
Finland 20 18 2 5 6 7 - 13 3 4 
Sweden 13 (2) 7 3 (2) 2 5 (1) 5 3 (1) 10 8 2 
Total 50 31 10 16 11 (1) 17 4 (3) 33 21 6 
 
Herkman (2016) analysed the meanings given to populism in the Nordic press in the beginning of 
the 2010s and discovered that populism, when explicitly mentioned, was most often linked to 
domestic populist parties or radical right-wing populism in Europe. Consequently, according to his 
analysis, the most common journalistic frames linked populism to nationalist and nativist 
ideologies, emphasising either a nostalgic yearning for a “lost national heartland” (Taggart, 2000) 
or the hostile exclusion of immigrants and other non-native groups of people from the population 
(Mudde, 2007). However, populism was commonly linked to empty political rhetoric (Bale et al., 
2011) and it was also framed more neutrally as a political movement or even positively as an 
indicator of “the people’s will” in some Swedish and Finnish newspaper articles. 
Similarities can be found between these framings and the signifiers depicting populism in political 
cartoons but because political cartoons create such a different form of representation compared to 
newspaper articles, the significations of populism also varied. In political cartoons, populism cannot 
be discussed on an abstract level but is visualised through caricatures of the portrayed characters 
and their actions. Therefore, populist characters were depicted with various identifiable features or 
signifiers that linked them to nationalist and nativist ideologies and those signifiers were more 
specific and presented in a more pointed, i.e. caricatured, way than in news discourse. This became 
particularly evident through several direct references to fascism and Nazism in political cartoons 
that, in turn, were almost absent in news discourse. 
In addition to references to fascism and Nazism, nativist ideology was commonly represented in 
political cartoons by populist characters’ xenophobic or hostile behaviour towards non-native 
groups. Together, these two visualisations – references to fascism and Nazism and references to 
racism and nativism – were the most popular meanings associated with populist characters in the 
sample cartoons (see Table 2). However, the actions termed “populism” here as well as the 
depictions of the populist parties’ successes were common in political cartoons. The former 
category refers to cartoons in which populist characters were portrayed as demagogic politicians 
who do not conduct responsible politics. Populist characters classified in the latter category were 
shown as triumphant in the success of their party in the cartoons, often while leaders of other (more 
mainstream) parties marvelled at their success. A few cartoons were also simply traditional political 
caricatures of populist figures. 
The aim of political cartoons is to satirise and therefore to criticise politics and politicians (Hess & 
Northrop, 2011), meaning that most of the sample cartoons portrayed the politicians in a critical 
light. However, the cartoons were not uniform in their stance towards the populist politicians and 
parties, which partly derives from the incongruent nature of humour (see Palmer, 1994). 
Nevertheless, only a few of the cartoons depicting the success of the populist movements were 
positive in their representations. However, in this, the portrayals of populist politicians are not 
different to representations of other (more mainstream) politicians, because – as mentioned – 
political cartoons tend to criticise all the politicians they caricature. Thus, what is different are the 
visual signifiers used in this criticism. 
Visual semiotics of the cartoons 
As the main topics of the cartoons demonstrate, such signifiers of right-wing populism as fascism 
and Nazism were common in Denmark and in Sweden, while signifiers of nativism and racism were 
common in Denmark and in Finland. The signifiers of fascism and Nazism included such features 
as swastikas, (Nazi) uniforms and caps as well as “Sieg Heil”or Nazi salutes and “Hitler 
moustaches”. These signifiers were crystallised, for example, in the Danish art collective 
Schwimmelmann’s cartoon in which Pia Kjærsgaard and Morten Messerschmidt were depicted as 
paper dolls or jumping jacks dressed in Nazi uniforms and cap, raising their arms to give Nazi 
salutes. The cartoon was part of the collective’s campaign against DF in 2009 explicitly 
demonstrating the public struggle over imaginaries linked to Danish populism (see Image 1). 
Kjærsgaard and Thulesen Dahl are also wearing uniforms in two Jens Hage’s cartoons, and 
Messerschmidt has a Hitler moustache in one caricature imitating an election poster. In one cartoon 
published on 14 December 2008 in Ekstra Bladet, a Danish pastor and MP of DF, Søren Krarup, 
whips an immigrant with Hitler’s Mein Kampf. 
Image 1 
In Swedish cartoons, the signifiers of Nazism are less explicitly linked to the caricatured persons 
than to the party and are more likely to signify the ideological background of the SD as a National 
Socialist movement. The most common (and the only) signifier of Nazism in these cartoons was the 
swastika. The use of the swastika made clear that SD is not an ordinary party but has an extremist 
movement background. The message was often emphasised by accompanying references to the so-
called “iron-bar scandal” in which three key members of SD in 2010 – Erik Almqvist, Kent Ekeroth 
and Christian Westling – insulted comedian Soran Ismail and others by making racist and sexist 
comments; they also armed themselves with iron-bars taken from scaffolding in Stockholm city 
centre. The scandal burst out almost two years later in 2012 when popular paper Expressen 
published video-clips of the original incident (see Anonymized, 2017c). 
After the scandal, Jan-Erik Ander drew a cartoon in which SD’s leader Jimmie Åkesson speaks on a 
shaky stage constructed from a spirit bottles (“helrör”) and iron-bars (“järnrör”) tied to each other in 
swastika form (see Image 2). The same motif was repeated in Ander’s cartoon two years later, in 
which Björn Olof Sönder rope danced with a unicycle that contains a swastika in its wheel. Sönder 
tries to balance himself by holding an iron-bar in his left hand and a chairman’s gavel in his right 
hand. 
Image 2 
In Finnish cartoons, the use of signifiers linked to Nazism or Fascism was less striking than in 
Swedish and Danish cartoons, even though, signifiers like a Nazi salute and swastika were used in a 
few cartoons by Jari and Ranta. However, nativist and racist ideology often ignored Nazism as a 
signifier in Finnish cartoons, whereas nationalist symbols, such as the Finnish flag, were 
emphasised. Even in Ranta’s cartoons, which were by far the most critical of PS in the Finnish 
context, the criticism was more often signified by associating it with nationalism and racism rather 
than Nazism – as it was in the sampled cartoon from 2011 in which MP Immonen is sent to a course 
on how to “hide your racism” by the party leader Soini (see Image 3). 
Image 3 
Signifying the domestic populist party with nativist and nationalist signifiers was very common also 
in Denmark, in which strict immigration policies have been in place for the whole of the 21st 
century, during which time DF has assisted the governing cabinet (see Rydgren, 2010). Most 
commonly, the cartoons criticized the nativist approach of DF that emphasises the special status of 
Denmark in comparison to other nation states or non-native ethnic groups. Typically, as seen in one 
cartoon drawn by Jens Hage in 2011, the leading figures of DF (e.g. Kjærsgaard and Thulesen 
Dahl) were portrayed as dogs that guard the Danish barbed-wire fence border from the EU and pee 
onto the other side of the border. In Danish cartoons, nationalism was often signified by the Danish 
red-white coloured flag being abused by the DF members. However, in some cartoons clear 
connections to racism were also made, as in Anne-Mette Steen Petersen’s image from 2005, in 
which Kjærsgaard is depicted as a character in the children’s card game “Old Maid (Black Peter)” – 
wearing a red and white dress and dragging a black baby doll. 
In all the countries, the caricatured politicians were also portrayed as “populists” in the sense that 
they differed from “serious” politicians because of their demagogic rhetoric or style. In some 
Finnish and Danish cartoons, this was signified, for example, by the megaphones populist 
politicians use when shouting their xenophobic message at “the people”. In Swedish cartoons, the 
populist signification was clear in several images that placed SD leader Åkesson alongside other 
commonly identified European right-wing populist figures, such as Soini, Geert Wilders from the 
Netherlands, Marine Le Pen (Front National) from France, Nigel Farage (UKIP) from the UK and 
Hans-Christian Strache (FPÖ) from Austria. The clear statement was made in Jan-Erik Ander’s 
cartoon, published in 2015, in which Åkesson and Le Pen are portrayed as marionettes 
manoeuvered by Vladimir Putin’s funding – signified by the bundle of bank notes in his 
hand,suggesting that Putin is the real spin doctor of European right-wing populism. 
However, some positive images of the domestic populist parties and their politicians were also 
published in Sweden and Finland during the first half of the 2010s. In Sweden, most of these 
cartoons were traditional caricatures of political leaders, such as Lennart Moberg’s drawings of 
Jimmie Åkesson, indicating the increased societal status of these figures. Especially in Finland, 
some cartoons published in the leading daily Helsingin Sanomat and in the leading popular paper 
Ilta-Sanomat noticed the astonishing success of PS in the “big bang elections” of 2011 in a rather 
positive light. In these cartoons, the success of the party was signified, for example, by the 
increasing weight of the party leader Soini, by diagrams demonstrating the growth of PS at the 
expense of traditional mainstream parties or as beauty contests in which Soini succeeds. However, 
these kinds of images were exceptions among the Nordic cartoons portraying the domestic populist 
politicians. In general, the cartoons were critical of populist politicians where, especially in 
Denmark and Sweden, populism was often negatively connected to Nazism, Fascism, nativism and 
xenophobia. In general, the Danish cartoons highlighted the confrontation between pan-European 
openness and ethnic nationalism, whereas Swedish and Finnish cartoons emphasized the value 
conflict between the populist movement and other political players in their domestic political arena. 
Discussion 
The significations of populist actors in political cartoons reflect contextual differences in the images 
of the Nordic populist parties of the early 21st century (cf. Van Hecke, 2017, pp. 144–145). SD’s 
representation as a movement trying to polish its shield but having “true roots” or a background in 
National Socialism enforces both fascist, racist and more neutral significations. In turn, PS, from 
2010 to 2015 were a quite traditional populist protest movement linked to its predecessor the 
Finnish Rural Party (1959–1995), combining anti-elite appeal and demands for social equality with 
criticism of immigration, and were depicted more heterogeneously and occasionally even positively 
during their successful 2011 elections. Perhaps, most strikingly, DF was connected very visibly to 
Nazism and racism in Danish political cartoons between 2005 and 2010. 
The result can be partly explained by the life cycle phases of the parties. DF lived its insurgent 
phase earlier than its Nordic counterparts in Finland and Sweden. Nor can one forget the impact of 
the Mohammed cartoon crisis in Denmark that “re-politicised the Danish press” (Esmark & Ørsten, 
2008, p. 40) and, as a kind of counter effect, increased the provocativeness of political cartoons in 
the name of freedom of speech (e.g. Eide et al., 2008). However, more recently DF has entered the 
“established phase” of a populist party’s life cycle (see Stewart et al., 2003, pp. 221–223), proved 
by the fact that during the first parliamentary elections of the 2010s, the general media attention DF 
received was quite modest and “normalised” (Anonymized, 2017a). Furthermore, there were also 
far fewer large-scale political scandals linked to DF in Denmark than to SD in Sweden or PS in 
Finland between 2010 and 2015 (Anonymized, 2017c). 
Thus, compared to the Swedish and Finnish right-wing populist parties, DF’s long-term popularity 
and position as a party that assists the governing cabinet has normalised it within the Danish 
political arena in the 2010s. In addition, Danish political culture seems to be more “tolerant” of 
populism in its discourse than the Swedish or Finnish public is, which might partly explain the 
extremity of the Danish cartoons (cf. Esmark & Ørsten, 2008, pp. 40–41). It can also be argued that 
the imagery associated with SD and PS might have recently changed as SD has gained popularity 
and become more mainstream, whereas PS has become a clearly radical, right-wing populist party 
with a nativist programme, although the sample of the study does not allow us to test that 
hypothesis. However, one can claim that the success and life cycle phase of a domestic populist 
party will correlate with the particular moral order of the context. 
It is also obvious that not only do national contexts and political cultures affect cartoons, so do the 
differences between the individual cartoonists. This was evident in the Finnish case in which Ranta 
differed strikingly from other cartoonists with his critical stance of the domestic populist movement, 
whereas Karlsson presented a rather modest form of criticism (Anonymized, 2017b). The difference 
might be partly explained by the publications – Ranta’s cartoons were published in Kirkko & 
Kaupunki that highlights ethical discussions, whereas Karlsson’s cartoons are published in 
Helsingin Sanomat, the largest and most established daily of Finland – but a more probable 
explanation is the cartoonists’ different starting points in style and method. Therefore, the 
overrepresentation of Jan-Erik Anders’ cartoons in the Swedish sample may bias the image of the 
Swedish case. Even if the Swedish media has generally been critical of SD and its approaches, only 
Anders portrayed SD in such a negative light in the sample. 
The two-fold nature of humour employed in political cartoons may also explain the result. It is 
widely known that various political statements can be made via humour far more easily than they 
can by serious and rational argumentation (Kuipers, 2012). Billig (2001), for example, has 
demonstrated how the extreme right has applied humour in its nativist and racist discourses to 
strengthen their group identity and to downplay criticism of these discourses. The liberal discourses 
in political cartoons can quite similarly benefit from humour and indicate alleged links (i.e. 
signifiers) between the extreme right and right-wing populist parties in a way that is not accepted, 
for example, in general political news discourse (cf. Van Hecke, 2017, p. 143). 
Conclusion 
The success of right-wing populist movements has shaken the formerly rather stable Nordic party 
system in the 21st century. The conservative and nativist approach of these movements has broken 
the traditional separation of right and left blocs and emphasised norm and value confrontations, thus 
nurturing the imaginaries of political cartoonists. The rise of populist sentiment has created fertile 
ground for political satire, which is keen to focus on contemporary ideological confrontations and 
other contested areas. Therefore, an analysis of the signifiers depicting populism in political 
cartoons reveals how the moral order behind the social imaginaries of the Nordic countries in the 
21st century has been provocatively contested by right-wing populism (cf. Taylor, 2003). 
In general, it seems that political cartoons emphasised the extremist right-wing features of the 
Nordic populist parties more than is common in news coverage (cf. Herkman, 2016; Anonymized, 
2017a). The result might be biased due to the selected sampling method, but it is also 
understandable, since political cartoons tend to highlight the underlying tendencies and ideas of the 
given moment (Greenberg, 2002, p. 181; Hess & Northrop, 2011, p. 20), constructing controversial 
political tensions by means of caricature (Abraham, 2009, p. 120; Navasky, 2013, p. 35). Thus, the 
cartoons indicated the insurgent phase of the populist parties by emphasizing liberal values and 
confronting these parties and linking the cartoons within the discourse of “watch-dog news media”. 
 
The Nordic countries have been perhaps the most distinguished representatives of liberal 
democracies anywhere. The ideas of human rights, equality between the sexes and the rights of 
sexual, ethnic and religious minorities as well as freedom of speech have been pursued vigorously 
in all Nordic countries, Sweden has especially carried out rather generous immigration and refugee 
policies. However, right-wing populist movements have attacked all the values central to the liberal 
democracies of the Nordic region and then, in turn, they have been attacked by political cartoonists, 
who seem to strongly defend the liberal ethos as their core value. 
The differences between the signifiers of populism in political cartoons echoed the differences in 
the particular populist parties and in political cultures. However, the links between the portrayal of 
populism and the life cycle phase of the domestic populist party suggest that as these parties 
become ever more mainstream, the moral order of liberal democracy might also change. Thus, the 
public discourse or tone around populism is softened and the satirical edge of the political cartoons 
seeks new targets and signifiers. In addition to helping populist movements establish themselves in 
the public eye, changes in the media environment may also help to explain the change in the moral 
order. In a contemporary “hybrid media system” (Chadwick, 2013) traditional news media is 
intertwined with online media and social media in multiple ways, and the populist’s identity and 
community construction is essentially promoted through social media platforms (Krämer, 2017). 
Regarding current struggles surrounding moral order, it may be that political cartoons play only a 
minor role – mostly as an inspiration for debates and memes circulated in social media forums. 
Therefore, further studies are needed to ascertain whether populist parties enjoying electoral success 
have changed opinion discourses and altered their signification in the political cartoons of the late 
2010s. 
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